Two new methodologies are introduced to improve inference in the evaluation of mutual fund performance against benchmarks. First, the benchmark models are estimated using panel methods with both fund and time effects. Second, the non-normality of individual mutual fund returns is accounted for by using panel bootstrap methods. We also augment the standard benchmark factors with fund-specific characteristics, such as fund size. Using a dataset of UK equity mutual fund returns, we find that fund size has a negative effect on the average fund manager's benchmark-adjusted performance. Further, when we allow for time effects and the non-normality of fund returns, we find that there is no evidence that even the best performing fund managers can significantly out-perform the augmented benchmarks after fund management charges are taken into account.
Introduction
Evidence collected over an extended period on the performance of (open-ended) mutual funds in the US (Jensen, 1968; Malkiel, 1995; Barras, Scaillet and Wermers, 2010) and unit trusts and open-ended investment companies (OEICs) in the UK (Blake and Timmermann, 1998; Cuthbertson, Nitzsche and O'Sullivan, 2008) has found that, on average, a fund manager cannot outperform the market benchmark and that any outperformance is more likely to be due to "luck" rather than "skill". The standard approach for evaluating fund manager performance is to test it against an appropriate factor benchmark model and assess the significance of the abnormal returns from this model (Carhart, 1997) . Recent evidence in Chen, Hong, Huang and Kubik (2004) (hereafter CHHK) finds that fund size has a negative effect on performance due to diseconomies of scale at the fund level (in line with Berk and Green, 2004 ). CHHK's analysis applies the Fama and MacBeth (1973) method of estimating a series of cross-sectional regressions (one for each time period), averaging the estimated coefficients and testing for significance using the time-series variation in these estimates.
However, Petersen (2009) has shown that this methodology yields downward biased standard errors in the presence of fund effects. He explains how to estimate standard errors in the presence of both fund and time effects: either parametrically by including a time dummy for each period, and then clustering standard errors by fund; or non-parametrically by clustering on fund and time simultaneously.
1 Kosowski, Timmermann, Wermers and White (2006, hereafter KTWW) have argued that it is necessary to assess the statistical significance of fund manager performance using bootstrap methods, since the returns of individual mutual funds typically exhibit non-normal distributions (see also Fama and French, 2010, hereafter FF) .
In this paper, we will assess the performance of a panel of mutual funds, allowing for the role of fund-specific characteristics, such as fund size, fund charges, and fund family membership.
We estimate a panel model using fixed effects and time dummies with standard errors clustered by fund. In addition, acknowledging that fund returns are not normally distributed,
we generate a series of (non-parametric and parametric) bootstrap returns from the benchmark models to allow for appropriate statistical inference in the presence of non-normal fund returns. 1 Standard errors have been correctly computed in the econometrics literature for decades under different assumptions on stochastic properties of the errors (e.g., Hsiao, 1986 , Bhargava, 1987 .
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The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing approaches to measuring mutual fund performance and shows how these approaches can be improved using bootstrap methods in a panel framework. Section 3 discusses the dataset we will be using.
The results are presented in Section 4, while Section 5 concludes.
Measuring mutual fund performance

Measuring performance using alternative benchmark models
Building on Jensen (1968) , the standard framework for assessing the performance of the manager of mutual fund i is to compare the excess returns () it t R rf  (where t rf is the risk-free rate) obtained in period t with a four-factor benchmark model (Carhart, 1997) :
where the four common risk factors are the excess return on the market index () mt t R rf  , the returns on a size factor, t SMB , a book-to-market factor, t HML (Fama and French, 1993) , and a momentum factor, t MOM (Carhart, 1997) . The idea behind (2.1) is that there are certain common factors that are known to influence returns and that the effect of these should be excluded from any measure of a fund manager's performance. The genuine "skill" of the fund manager, controlling for these common factors, is measured by alpha (α i ) which is also known as the "selectivity skill".
2 Under the null hypothesis of no abnormal performance (i.e., no selectivity skill), the estimated ˆi  coefficient should be equal to zero. For each fund, we could test the significance of each ˆi  as a measure of that fund's abnormal performance relative to its standard error; and we could also test the significance of the average value of the alpha across the N funds in the sample (Malkiel, 1995) .
However, there are a number of problems with the standard framework. First, it is potentially incomplete since it excludes fund-specific variables which might influence performance.
2 Ferson and Schadt (1996) suggest a conditional version of this four-factor benchmark model that controls for time-varying factor loadings. However, KTWW report that the results from estimating the conditional and unconditional models are very similar, and in the remainder of this paper we follow them and only consider the unconditional version of (2.1). It is also possible to allow for market timing when fund managers take an aggressive position in a bull market (by holding high-beta stocks) and a defensive position in a bear market (by holding low-beta stocks) (Treynor and Mazuy, 1966; Henriksson and Merton, 1981) , although we do not allow for market timing here.
Second, it is based on single equation estimation and ignores the panel nature of the dataset which comprises a group of competing fund managers. The final problem is that it fails to take adequate account of the distributional properties of the error term, it  , which are unknown, but unlikely to be normal.
With respect to the first problem, a number of other variables have also been shown to affect mutual fund performance. CCHK and Yan (2008) establish an inverse relationship between mutual fund size and performance: small funds outperform large funds, and this provides support for the Berk and Green (2004) hypothesis that fund inflows degrade the performance of the fund management team, conditional on the chosen benchmark. In respect of the characteristics of the individual managers, Chevalier and Ellison (1999a) report that the education level of the fund manager, as measured by the quality of the university that the fund manager attended, affects cross-sectional differences in performance. They also show that other individual fund manager characteristics affect the fund's asset allocation strategies which, in turn, determine performance. Khorana (1996) and Chevalier and Ellison (1999b) document an inverse relationship between fund performance and manager changes. Star fund managers can extract a larger share of the higher fee income by either moving to a larger fund within the same organization or to another fund family (Chen, Hong, Jiang and Kubik, 2013) .
Network and spillover effects have been shown to be important determinants of mutual fund returns (Nanda, Wang and Zheng, 2004; Hong, Kubik and Stein, 2005; Cohen, Frazzini and Malloy, 2008) . Extreme examples of such networks are fund families, where a group of mutual funds are all owned by the same management firm. Massa (2003) shows that alternative investment strategies of mutual funds within the same family are a form of product differentiation, and that the degree of product differentiation negatively affects performance.
Our dataset contains a number of fund-specific variables. Based on the arguments above, we are able to test whether the performance of a fund is, in addition to the standard common factors, influenced by certain fund-specific factors, namely the natural logarithm of the relative size of assets under management (lnAUM), 3 the bid-ask spread (Spread), 4 the natural logarithm of the relative size of assets under management of the corresponding fund family (lnFAUM), 5 and by the average management charge of the fund family (FMC). 6 We augment the regression equation (2.1) to include these fund-specific variables.
With respect to the second problem, the standard approach estimates equation (2.1) over time for each fund separately, resulting in no allowance being made for any common time effects across funds, on the grounds that the four-factor model adequately captures the systematic components of fund returns. However, if the four-factor model is mis-specified or incomplete, there may be common time effects across funds in the sample, which could be captured using time dummies. One way to allow for any common dependence across time of the funds in the sample is to follow Blake and Timmermann (1998) 
where ii     is the average "skill" level across all funds and time (  ) plus the additional fund-specific "skill" level ( i  ), t  is a time effect, 7 and 5 The relative size is defined as the ratio of the fund family's assets under management to the average value of assets under management across all fund families in the same month. 6 These fund family variables will indirectly pick up network effects and also whether better qualified managers are employed by large fund families. 7 The time effects are measured by time dummies defined to sum to zero across all time periods. The dummies are also bi-monthly rather than monthly on account of a very high degree of multicollinearity we encountered when using monthly time dummies. 
At the second stage, the following model is estimated (where we have added time effects to the CCHK specification):
We also report results from this two-stage process.
The final problem with the standard approach that needs to be addressed is the non-normality of returns. KTWW (p.2559) put this down to the possibilities that (1) the residuals of fund returns are not drawn from a multivariate normal distribution, (2) correlations in these residuals are non-zero, (3) funds have different risk levels, and (4) parameter estimation error results in the standard critical values of the normal distribution being inappropriate in the cross section. The solution is to use bootstrap methods to derive more accurate confidence intervals and hence improve inference.
Measuring performance using bootstrap methods
The non-parametric bootstrap
On account of non-normalities in fund returns, bootstrap methods can be applied to the standard benchmark model (2.1) and the augmented model (2.2) or (2.4) to assess performance. The non-parametric bootstrap of FF is a single equation bootstrap, but it does 7 preserve the cross-correlation of returns across both funds and common risk factors. 8 We will modify the FF bootstrap to a panel framework.
It turns out that our panel has a fairly standard structure. It is static so does not face the problems of a dynamic panel with lagged dependent variables. 9 It also has a large number of funds (N = 561) and a large number of time series observations (T = 129 months), so does not suffer from the fixed effects estimator being asymptotically biased which would result in the computed confidence intervals being unreliable because the coverage rate is below the nominal level (Neyman and Scott, 1948; Nickell, 1981; Beran, 1987 Beran, , 1990 Martin, 1990; Hahn and Kuersteiner, 2002 ).
We will illustrate the FF bootstrap using the augmented benchmark model (2.2). The FF approach is to calculate the alpha for each fund using the time series regression (2.2). It then re-samples with replacement over the full cross section of returns, thereby producing a common time ordering across all funds in each bootstrap. In our study, we re-sample from all monthly observations in the dataset and we impose the null hypothesis as in FF by subtracting the estimate of alpha from each re-sampled month's returns. 10 For each fund i and each bootstrap b, we regress the pseudo abnormal returns on the factors:
and save the estimated 10,000 bootstrapped alphas { , 1,... , ; 1,...,10,000}
and tstatistics { ( ), 1,... , ; 1,...,10,000}
8 This contrasts with the KTWW bootstrap which assumes independence between the residuals across different funds and that the influence of the common risk factors is fixed historically. In other words, the KTWW bootstrap assesses fund manager skill controlling only for the effect of non-systematic risk. 9 Using a test proposed by Bhargava, Franzini and Narendranathan (1982) , we found no evidence suggesting the presence of autocorrelation in the estimated model. Berk and Green (2004) argue that fund flows ensure there is no persistence in mutual fund returns (as distinct from the underlying asset returns). 10 To illustrate, for bootstrap b = 1, suppose that the first time-series drawing is month 37 t  ; then the first set of pseudo abnormal returns incorporating zero abnormal performance for this bootstrap is found by deducting 
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We now have the cross-sectional distribution of alphas from all the bootstrap simulations that result from the sampling variation under the null that the true alpha is zero. The bootstrapped alphas can be ranked from smallest to largest to produce the "luck" (i.e., pure chance or "zero-skill" 11 ) cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the alphas. We have a similar cross-   . In the context of our specification which uses both fund fixed effects and time effects, testing this hypothesis requires the computation of the test statistic using the appropriate elements of the coefficient variance-covariance matrix.
The parametric bootstrap
A key problem with the non-parametric bootstrap outlined above is that it draws the observations of interest (fund returns) from a uniform distribution. This will give excessive weight to observations in the tail of the true but unknown distribution and will, correspondingly, underestimate the probability of appearing in the centre of the distribution.
It also ignores the skewness and kurtosis in the underlying fund returns data. These shortcomings can be alleviated by the use of a parametric bootstrap which assumes that the returns from each fund are drawn from a stable distribution that reflects the distributional properties of the realised returns over the sample period. 13 A potential weakness of this approach, however, is that any cross-sectional dependence is lost (Kapetanios, 2008) .
Again using the augmented benchmark model to illustrate, we estimate (2.2) and retrieve the estimated residuals, ˆi t  , for each fund i. We then estimate the parameters of a stable distribution for these residuals following Zolotarev (1986) and, in particular, the approach suggested by Nolan (1997) .
11 The term "zero skill" is used in the finance literature to mean "zero alpha". 12 KTWW (p. 2559) note that the t-statistic also provides a correction for spurious outliers by dividing the estimated alpha by a high estimated standard error when the fund has a short life or undertakes risky strategies. 13 Bhargava (1987, p. 802) 
it S      is generally specified in terms of its Fourier transform or characteristic function (Zolotarev, 1986, p.11) : 
Data
The data used in this study combines information from data providers Lipper, Morningstar 15 The sample is free from survivor bias (Elton, Gruber and Blake, 1996; Carpenter and Lynch, 1999) and includes funds that both were created during the sample period and exited due to liquidation or merger.
Gross returns are calculated from bid-to-bid prices and include reinvested dividends. These are reported net of ongoing operating and trading costs, but before the fund management charge has been deducted. 16 We also compute "net" returns for each fund by deducting the monthly equivalent of the annual fund management charge. We have complete information on these fees for 451 funds. For each of the remaining 65 funds, each month we subtract the median monthly fund management charge for the relevant sector class and size quintile from the fund's gross monthly return. Following convention, we exclude initial and exit fees from our definition of returns. Table 3 .1 provides some descriptive statistics on the returns to and the size of the mutual funds in our dataset. The average monthly gross return across all funds (equally weighted) and months in the data set is 0.45% (45 basis points), compared with an average monthly return over the same sample period of 0.36% for the FT-All Share Index (not reported). 17 The overall standard deviation of these returns is 4.82%, and the reported percentiles of the distribution of returns also emphasise that there is some variability in these returns. In the subsequent regression analysis, we require a minimum number of observations to undertake a 14 These data providers required a confidentiality clause which prohibits us from publishing their data. The names of the 516 funds used in the main analysis of our study and the dates over which the monthly returns were available are contained in a spreadsheet on the Pensions Institute website (pensions-institute.org). 15 We analyse all the funds together in this study; we do not report the separate analysis for each sector due to space constraints. 16 Operating costs include administration, record-keeping, research, custody, accounting, auditing, valuation, legal costs, regulatory costs, distribution, marketing and advertising. Trading costs include commissions, spreads and taxes. 17 Note that the FT-All Share Index return is gross of any costs and fees.
meaningful statistical analysis and we impose the requirement that time series fund parameters are only estimated when there were 20 or more monthly gross returns reported for that mutual fund. We also report key percentiles of the distribution of gross returns for the sub-sample of 516 mutual funds with a minimum of 20 time-series observations, and this can be compared with the distribution of returns across the whole sample to confirm that the subsample is indeed representative. 18 Overall, these results indicate that survivorship bias is negligible in this dataset. The mean monthly net return is 0.35%, implying that the mean monthly fund management fee is 0.11%. The mean return is now very close to the mean return of 0.36% for the FT-All Share Index. This provides initial confirmation that the average mutual fund manager cannot "beat the market" (i.e., cannot beat a buy-and-hold strategy invested in the market index), once all costs and fees have been taken into account.
The final column shows that the distribution of scheme size is skewed: with the median fund value in September 2008 being £64 million and the mean value £240 million. It can be seen that 10% of the funds have values above £527 million.
Results
We now turn to assessing the performance of UK equity mutual funds over the period 1998- 
Performance assessed by factor benchmark models: pooled single equation estimates
Following Blake and Timmermann (1998) and Fama and French (2010) , In all cases in Table 4 .1, the measure of fund manager performance alpha ( p  ) is not significant in the four-factor model. This result holds whether the portfolio is equal-weighted or value-weighted, or whether we use gross returns or net returns. The implication of these results is that the average equity mutual fund manager in the UK is unable to deliver outperformance (i.e., unable to add value from the key active investment strategy of stock selection), once allowance is made for fund manager charges and for a set of common risk factors that are known to influence returns, thereby reinforcing our findings from our examination of raw returns in Table 3 .1. This is a common finding when using the standard benchmark model (2.1), and is comparable with both previous UK (Blake and Timmermann, 1998 ) and the US results (Fama and French, 2010) .
Performance assessed by factor and augmented benchmark models: panel regression estimates
We now re-estimate these models using fixed-effects panel regressions with clustered standard errors at the fund level. The results of these panel estimations are presented in Panel A of Table 4 .2 for gross returns and in Panel B for net returns. 19 We use the monthly FTSE All-Share Index as the market benchmark for all UK equities. We take the excess return of this index over the UK Treasury bill rate.
,, Gregory, Tharyan and Christidis (2013) . 20 Note that the estimated factor loadings for the models where the dependent variable is based on gross returns are very similar to those in the corresponding models where the dependent variable is based on net returns. This is because the fund management fee is fairly constant over time. While this will lead to different estimates of the intercept ( p  ) in a regression equation, it will not lead to significant changes in the estimates of the other coefficients.
Model 1 is the standard four-factor benchmark model (2.1), except that the model is estimated as a panel, so we drop the i subscript from (2.1). The results are given in the first column of Panels A and B. We can see that for gross returns the average alpha is a significant 0.0002, while for net returns the average alpha is a highly significant but negative -0.0010. Model 2 is the augmented specification (2.2) which includes the fund characteristics as in CHHK but now estimated as a panel. The second column of Panels A and B shows that the coefficient on fund size is negative and highly significant, indicating that increasing fund size has a material effect in lowering a fund's performance. Once we control for fund size and the other fundspecific factors -in particular, family fund size -the average fund manager's alpha for both gross and net returns is insignificantly different from zero. This implies that if better qualified managers do manage the largest funds in the largest fund families -which is entirely plausible -they do not appear to deliver outperformance: in other words, the size of the fund overwhelms any superior skills they might have, as predicted by Berk and Green (2004) .
Model 3 is the second stage of the CHHK modelling approach, but estimated as a panel. In the first stage, we estimate a time series model for each fund to obtain estimates of the loadings on the four factors, and we compute the abnormal returns from this estimated fourfactor model for each fund in each month (see (2.3) above). In the second stage, we estimate these abnormal returns on the fund-specific characteristics in a panel using fixed effects with clustered standard errors (see (2.4) above). As with Model 2, in the third column of Panels A and B, we can see that the coefficient on fund size is again negative and significant.
Similarly, alpha is insignificant.
Model 4 is Model 3 with time dummies. The effect of including time dummies is to render the average fund manager's alpha significantly negative for both gross and net returns. The intuition for this is that there are common shocks across all mutual funds in particular months, which are not captured by the standard common factors or the additional fundspecific variables, but which, on average, enhance the fund's performance. These common shocks are unrelated to individual fund manager selectivity skills, but are being picked up in the alpha estimates in Models 1-3, and are being wrongly attributed to manager skill. 21 We needed the time dummies to separate these different effects.
Performance assessed by simulations: non-parametric and parametric bootstraps
The panel estimation framework in Model 4, although dealing with the cross correlations in the error terms and time effects, does not account for any non-normalities in excess returns.
We now allow for these non-normalities using non-parametric and parametric panel bootstrap simulations.
We first summarise the properties of the stable distributions underlying the panel bootstraps. There is strong evidence of deviations from normality in Table 4 .3 as the majority of the estimated stability index parameters ( 1  ) is below 2, indicating the prevalence of leptokurtic distributions. 23 This departure from normality informs our parametric bootstrap, since we draw samples from the estimated stable distributions which by and large exhibit "fat tails".
Although the moments of stable distributions such as skewness and kurtosis are not always defined (depending upon the value of the index of stability), our bootstrap methodology takes fully into account the existence of fat tails and skewness.
We report the bootstrap results for the augmented model (2.2). Panel A of Table 4 .4 summarises the distribution of the t-statistics of the alphas based on gross returns. The first column reports selected percentiles from the CDF of the actual t-statistics,
, ranked from lowest to highest. The next two columns report the CDFs significantly negative. The reason for this is not clear. The size and significance of the other parameters are robust to the inclusion of the time dummies. 22 It is worth mentioning here that the sum of stable distributions with the same index of stability follows a stable distribution. Stable distribution sharing the same stability index can be first-order stochastically ordered according to their scale parameter (Rachev and Mittnik, 2000) . 23 Only 150 out of 516 funds had a 1  parameter close to 2 and a 2  parameter close to zero, indicating a distribution close to normality.
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of the "luck" distributions, { ( ), 1,... ,516; 1,...,10,000} statistics lies entirely to the left of those generated by the luck distributions, implying that all the fund managers perform worse than pure chance, once we control for the common risk factors and key fund-specific variables, especially fund size. 24 The two figures also show the 5-95% confidence intervals for the two bootstraps. In both figures, only around 1% of fund managers generate statistically significant positive alphas, although we cannot rule out the possibility that these alphas are generated by pure luck.
Conclusions
Our paper introduces two new methodologies for improving inference in the evaluation of mutual fund performance. The first recognises the panel nature of the dataset and the possibility that there are both fund and time effects in mutual fund returns. To account for these, we estimate a panel regression with standard errors clustered by fund and with time dummies to allow for time effects. The second recognises the distributional properties of the individual mutual fund returns and the possibility that these might not be normal: a number of recent studies have dealt with this issue using a non-parametric bootstrap. However, the nonparametric bootstrap draws the observations of interest from a uniform distribution. This method of sampling gives excessive weight by assigning equal probability of appearance to observations that may lie in the tail of the true but unknown distribution. This can lead to biased estimates of the confidence intervals with a coverage rate below the nominal level. To correct for this, we use a parametric bootstrap for each fund generated by a stable distribution calibrated to reflect the actual distribution of that fund's returns over the sample period.
On the basis of a dataset of equity mutual funds in the UK over the period 1998-2008, we draw the following conclusions. The standard four-factor benchmark model, estimated as a panel regression with standard errors clustered by fund, suggests that the average UK equity mutual fund manager does not add value relative to the benchmark once the fund management charges are taken into account. However, the standard model excludes fundspecific characteristics which might influence performance and ignores potential time effects 24 The same general pattern holds for gross returns.
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in returns. In addition, most studies using the standard model fail to take adequate account of the non-normal distribution of the fund manager's returns.
If we include fund size as an additional variable, then the average fund manager's alpha over the whole of sample period is, depending on the model, zero or significantly negative for both gross and net returns. This confirms the earlier finding of Chen et al. (2004) and suggests that a larger fund size helps to reduce fund performance. Since the most likely explanation for the negative relationship between fund size and performance is the negative market impact effect from large funds attempting to trade in size (Keim and Madhavan, 1995) , this suggests that funds should split themselves up when they get to a certain size in order to improve the return to investors.
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The inclusion of time effects in the benchmark models further reinforces the statistical insignificance of the average fund manager's alpha. Our explanation for this is that there are time effects which are not captured by the standard common factors and which, in aggregate, enhance the average fund's performance. But these time effects are unrelated to individual fund manager selectivity skills, yet will have the effect of increasing the estimates of the average fund manager's alpha unless explicit allowance is made for them using time dummies.
The augmented model produces even stronger evidence of the absence of fund manager skills than the four-factor model because it conditions on a larger number of variables, so the hurdle is higher and what is left unexplained -namely, the noise, the uncertainty, the residual randomness -is reduced. Contained within the residual randomness of the benchmark model is the skill of the fund manager which we capture via our estimate of alpha. The combination of a higher hurdle and reduced noise means that fewer managers will be able to outperform.
Finally, if we allow for the non-normality of fund returns using a series of (both nonparametric and parametric) bootstrap simulations, we find that for the augmented model, there is no evidence that even the best performing fund managers can beat this benchmark when allowance is made for the costs of fund management. (1) all 561 funds (equally weighted) in the dataset for some time during the sample period and (2) for the 516 funds (equally weighted) in the dataset for at least 20 months. The third column shows this information for net returns which equal gross returns minus the monthly fund management charge for the 516 funds (equally weighted) in the dataset for at least 20 months. The fourth column shows the monthly fund management charge for the 516 funds (equally weighted) in the dataset for at least 20 months. The last column reports fund size (in £millions of assets under management) of the 287 funds in the dataset in the last month of the sample period, which reports this information. The results were produced in STATA. either the excess return on an equal-weighted portfolio or on a value-weighted portfolio p of all funds in existence at time t. The dependent variables in these regressions are based on the monthly returns on the 516 mutual funds that were in the dataset for at least 20 months for some time between January 1998 and September 2008 (129 months). They are measured both gross and net of fund management charges. White (1980) 's robust standard errors are reported in brackets underneath each parameter estimate: ***, ** and * denotes significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. The results were produced in STATA. 
2.02
The results are based on the augmented benchmark model (2.2), including fund-specific variables and time effects, where the dependent variable is based on the monthly returns on the 516 mutual funds that were in the dataset for at least 20 months for some time between January 1998 and September 2008 (129 months). 
